[3] Nothing can be said that goes to the essence of the sciences if it is not based in a science of sciences [s’il n’est pas de science des sciences]. Their syntax is such that one can only treat them as the object of a way of speaking [un langage] either by approaching them from the perspective whereby they are still to come (this is the discipline known as the history of the sciences, which deals only with their prehistory or progression), or by effacing what distinguishes them in the universe of discourse (by recourse to archaeology, the opposite of the sciences).

For one should see the sciences from the perspective whereby, lacking memory, they have no history, and live an eternal Present. This is an effect of the eternal Return of their birth, an infinitesimal time in which they incessantly render themselves independent of that which determines them to be [ce qui les détermine à être], and renounce their lineage. Genealogy here serves as a reminder of this forgotten lineage, in keeping with an inscription that is sufficiently neutral so as to annul the difference between the archaeologist and the historian.

We say: genealogy of the sciences, but science can also figure in the singular, so long as we take care to remember that this singular is plural. ‘All science, as research, is founded on the project of [clarifying] a delimited sector of objectivity; it is thus necessarily a particular science’ (Heidegger).

If the specialization (the pluralization) of science is thus implied in its concept a function is correlative to it, one that can be distinguished as its Ideal, which is to say that impossible point from which it sees, as if it were complete and entire, its divided body. Hence the mirage of an ideal science, a mirage that one can recognize at every theoretical conjuncture by the fact that a science reigns there, astronomy, physics or biology: by giving its partners the universal idiom in which they are translatable, this ideal science represents for them the fact that they are unities and in themselves whole [leur représente qu’elles sont unes et en elles entières].

In the play of mirrors that links the point of the Ideal to its imaged effect as ideal science, the names have varied: in classical times, the first was called God and the second geometry: but it fell to modern scientism to have closed this space and to have given the impossible point the traits of its imaginary correlate, by understanding it as Science. [4]

Confronted by so strong a knot of misunderstanding and of knowledge, genealogy must turn itself into forcing [se faire forçage]; faced with the beautiful continuity and mastery characteristic of Science, it may instead, at this price, emphasize the rupture and dependence it implies. It will hold the scientist himself accountable – the virtuous scientist (since he is upright, objective and liberal), and the egalitarian scientist (since in his eyes all have an equal right to truth). It will ask him about the fate of his desire, ransom of his virtues, and it will ask about the conditions under which he can maintain that all are equal before the truth.

At this point, genealogy must turn itself into the doctrine of foreclosure, even if this requires pursuing it not only in the subjective position it establishes, but also in the politics that insinuates itself there.